

“Being Just is Always a *Positive Attitude*”: Justice in Nietzsche’s Virtue Epistemology

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Abstract: In his early-middle works, most notably “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874) but also “Schopenhauer as Educator” (1874) and *Human, All Too Human* (1878–9), Nietzsche uses the concept of ‘justice’ (*Gerechtigkeit*) in an unusual way: he treats it as an individual virtue rather than a structural virtues of societies and political or legal systems; he distinguishes between practical and epistemic justice and focuses his analysis and praise almost exclusively on the latter; and he places unusual emphasis on the distinctive feeling or affect associated with the exercise of epistemic justice. This paper aims to make sense of Nietzsche’s peculiar conception of justice in by contextualizing it in two respects. First I show how it fits into and supports an interpretation of Nietzsche as a virtue epistemologist, as outlined by Mark Alfano in a 2013 paper. Then, with that interpretive framework in hand, I show how elements of Nietzsche’s epistemic and affective notion of justice persist into his later work, notably in his doctrine of perspectivism, in the more straightforwardly practical and political account of justice sketched in the Second Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), and his conception of the role of the philosopher of the future.

1. Introduction

In the second of the *Untimely Meditations*, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (1874), Nietzsche delivers a rare and lengthy encomium to the traditional Platonic-Aristotelian virtue of justice. “In truth,” he says, “no one has a greater claim to our veneration than he who possesses the drive to and strength for justice. For the highest and rarest virtues are united and concealed in justice as in an unfathomable ocean that receives streams and rivers from all sides and takes them into itself” (*HL* 6, p. 88¹). This claim seems to echo, or at least allude to, the thesis of Plato’s *Republic* that justice is the virtue in which the other virtues (wisdom, courage, and temperance) are united, each in its proper place in the organization of the just person’s soul.

¹ I include in my citations the page number in the Cambridge University Press edition of the *Untimely Meditations* (1997, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. D. Breazeale) because the sections are so long.

However, a closer look at Nietzsche's use of 'justice' (*Gerechtigkeit*) and related words in *HL* reveals three non-traditional, or anyway unconventional, features:

1. Nietzsche departs from the usage of most modern philosophers (including Nietzsche himself in much of his subsequent writing) by speaking of justice, like the ancients, as a virtue of individuals rather than solely of societies and political or legal systems.²

2. Nietzsche distinguishes between justice as a *practical* and as an *epistemic* virtue and focuses his analysis, and his praise, almost exclusively on the latter. The distinction can be observed in the following passage:

[I]magine a man seized by a vehement passion for a woman or for a great idea: how different the world has become to him! [...] All his valuations are altered and disvalued; there are so many things he is no longer capable of evaluating at all because he can hardly feel them anymore [...] It is the condition in which one is the least capable of being **just**³; narrow-minded, ungrateful to the past, blind to dangers, deaf to warnings, one is a little vortex of life in a dead sea of darkness and oblivion: and yet this condition—unhistorical, anti-historical through and through—is the womb not only of the **unjust** but of every **just** deed too [...] (*HL* 1, p. 64, bold emphasis added)

Or, to put it more plainly: a state of *epistemic* injustice is a precondition of any act of *practical* (i.e., moral or political) justice.

3. In connection with his treatment of justice as an individual rather than a structural virtue, Nietzsche places unusual emphasis on the distinctive feeling or affect associated with the exercise of the epistemic virtue of justice, "the pathos attending the office of judge [*das Pathos des Richterthums*]" (*HL* 6, p. 90). This passage is illustrative:

The hand of the just man who is empowered to judge [*Gericht zu halten*] no longer trembles when it holds the scales; he sets weight upon weight with inexorable disregard of himself, his eye is unclouded as it sees the scales rise and fall, and his voice is neither harsh nor tearful when he pronounces the verdict. If he were a cold demon of knowledge, he would spread about him the icy atmosphere of a dreadful suprahuman majesty which we would have to fear, not revere: but that he is a human being and yet nonetheless tries to ascend from indulgent doubt to stern certainty, from

² Robert Solomon (2001: 141) makes this observation about Nietzsche's usage, though not specifically in *HL*.

³ Literally, "It is the most unjust condition in the world"; but Hollingdale probably translated it the way he did to avoid the misreading that Nietzsche considers it a practical injustice that people find themselves in this condition.

tolerant mildness to the imperative “you must,” from the rare virtue of magnanimity to the rarest of all virtues, justice; that he resembles that demon but is from the start only a poor human being; and above all that he has every moment to atone for his humanity and is tragically consumed by an impossible virtue—all this sets him on a solitary height as the most *venerable* exemplar of the species man [...] (HL 6, p. 88)

Nietzsche insists repeatedly that justice of this sort is not to be confused with indifference or with mere “objectivity,” understood as the lack of subjective interest or involvement in the object of inquiry or in the judgment about it that is reached. He distinguishes sharply between the just man described above and “those ‘servants of truth’ who possess neither the will nor the power to judge [*zu richten*] and set themselves the task of seeking ‘pure, self-subsistent’ knowledge or, more clearly, truth that eventuates in nothing” (HL 6, p. 89). It is, Nietzsche maintains, a common but absurd modern misconception “to believe that he to whom a moment of the past *means nothing at all* is the proper man to describe it” (p. 92).

This paper aims to make sense of Nietzsche’s peculiar conception of justice in *HL* by contextualizing it in two respects. First I show how it fits into and supports an interpretation of Nietzsche as a virtue epistemologist, as outlined by Mark Alfano in his 2013 paper “The Most Agreeable of All Vices: Nietzsche as Virtue Epistemologist.”⁴ Then, with that interpretive framework in hand, I show how elements of Nietzsche’s epistemic and affective notion of justice persist into his later work, notably in his doctrine of perspectivism, in the more straightforwardly practical and political account of justice sketched in the Second Essay of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), and his conception of the role of the philosopher of the future.

To date almost all of the (few) treatments of justice in Anglophone Nietzsche scholarship

⁴ Alfano (2013) seems to be the only scholar who has proposed the connection with contemporary virtue epistemology, though a number of others have devoted investigations to Nietzschean epistemic or intellectual virtues, including A. White (2001), “The Youngest Virtue” (namely, *Redlichkeit*, usually translated as “honesty”); B. Reginster (2013), “Honesty and Curiosity in Nietzsche’s Free Spirits”; and S. Jenkins (2016), “Truthfulness as Nietzsche’s Highest Virtue.” However, Reginster (2013: 456, n. 26) makes an ambiguous remark suggesting that perhaps Nietzschean curiosity should be regarded as an *ethical* rather than a properly *epistemic* virtue.

have dealt only with the practical and usually also with the institutional rather than individual virtue of justice.⁵ Peter Sedgwick’s discussion of *HL* in his book *Nietzsche’s Justice* is mostly a summary, but he does identify the particular kind of injustice that Nietzsche claims is necessary for all action as “an epistemic injustice of interpretive violence” (2013: 41) and offers a helpful analysis of epistemic injustice in the context of *Human, All Too Human*, to which I will return further on.

2. Virtue in Nietzsche

By now it is not unusual among Nietzsche scholars to read Nietzsche as a virtue theorist of some variety.⁶ Most of the work in this area, like most of the work in contemporary virtue theory, focuses on virtue ethics rather than virtue epistemology. But as Alfano argues, a high proportion of the virtues Nietzsche praises—and especially of the ones he proudly attributes to himself and those like him—are *intellectual* rather than moral or practical virtues (2013: 769, 775ff.). Curiosity, honesty (with oneself rather than others: *A* 55), and intellectual cleanliness are obvious examples; but even apparently practical virtues like courage and sympathy are praised in the intellectual domain, for what they can contribute to inquiry (see Alfano 2013: 782–3). This preponderance, particularly in self-attributions, does make sense, considering that Nietzsche has devoted himself to a life of the mind, and that the people he spends much of his work analyzing

⁵ For recent examples, see Corder (2017) and Queloz (2017). Corder analyzes justice on the individual rather than the social or political level but treats it as an “orientation” toward an abstract value rather than explicitly as a virtue. Lemm (2010) simply misreads many of Nietzsche’s ascriptions and assessments of justice and injustice; I suspect she was misled by Nietzsche’s use of “justice” to refer almost exclusively to an epistemic virtue, as well as by his counterintuitive praise for a quality that is, by his own account, usually destructive for life.

⁶ Though Kaufmann (1950) was the first to propose such a reading, the specifics of his interpretation have been contested (notably by Magnus 1980) and the recent trend seems not to be a direct follow-on. Recent virtue-theoretic readings of Nietzsche include L. Hunt (1991), *Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue*; C. Swanton (1998), “Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics,” and (2015), *The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche*; R. Solomon (2001), “Nietzsche’s Virtues: A Personal Inquiry”; C. Daigle (2006), “Nietzsche: Virtue Ethics... Virtue Politics?”; and an entire issue of the *Journal of Value Inquiry* on the topic *Nietzsche and Virtue* (2015, Vol. 49, No. 3; though one contributor, J. Berry, denied the premise that Nietzsche was a virtue theorist).

are contemplative types engaged in intellectual pursuits: philosophers, free spirits, scholars.

Alfano (correctly, to my mind) identifies Nietzsche as a particular kind of virtue epistemologist: an *inquiry responsibilist*. The term “responsibilist” was coined by Lorraine Code (1984) distinguish her view from the “virtue reliabilism” of Ernest Sosa. As Alfano explains:

For Code, the “intellectually virtuous person” is identified not merely by his purely cognitive capacities, abilities and dispositions, but also by his conative attitudes toward truth and falsehood. He “finds value in knowing and understanding how things really are. He resists the temptation to live with partial explanations where fuller ones are attainable, the temptation to live in a fantasy or in a world of dream or illusion, considering it better to know, despite the tempting comfort and complacency that a life of fantasy or illusion (or well-tinged with fantasy and illusion) can offer” ([Code 1984:] 44). (Alfano 2013: 770)

Although Nietzsche often insists on the necessity of illusion for the preservation of life (in, e.g., *GS* 1, 107, 110; *BGE* 4, 34), one can find him just as often expressing contempt for those who rest content with unexamined opinions or need to take refuge in the unearned sense of certainty provided by faith, as well as expressing admiration for those who relentlessly interrogate received opinions and can do without certainties (*HH* 225–6, 630–7; *GS* 2, 347). These positions are not mutually exclusive, as Nietzsche indicates in *Beyond Good and Evil*:

Indeed, it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those who would know it completely would perish, in which case the strength of a spirit should be measured according to how much of the “truth” one could still barely endure—or to put it more clearly, to what degree one would *require* it to be thinned down, shrouded, sweetened, blunted, falsified. (*BGE* 39)

Unlike “classical responsibilists,” who like conventional analytic epistemologists occupy themselves with providing definitions of knowledge, justification, and the like, *inquiry* responsibilists like Jason Baehr and Christopher Hookway “focus on the *process* of investigation, the *value* of justification, knowledge and intellectual virtue, and the contribution of virtue to *flourishing*” (Alfano 2013: 772). Despite offering the occasional unusual, provocative definition of epistemic concepts like “objectivity” (*GM* III, 12), Nietzsche is obviously not interested in the same project of concept analysis or clarification as most contemporary

epistemologists. But he is interested in the qualities and motivations a person must have in order to be a successful inquirer, as well as the prospects for integrating these into a good human life. The line dividing this kind of virtue epistemology from virtue ethics may sometimes be blurred.⁷ Nietzsche's praise for epistemic virtues is sometimes conditioned or constrained by the extent to which they can contribute to a good life overall (as in, e.g., *GS* Pref. 4), which might raise the question whether he is in fact a virtue epistemologist or simply a very inquiry-focused virtue ethicist.⁸ My analysis of his conception of justice, especially in *HL*, will show that Nietzsche's assessment of intellectual virtues is sometimes focused *primarily* on their value for attaining knowledge rather than their value for the life of the person who possesses them. To that extent it is helpful to regard him as a virtue epistemologist.

How, then, does Nietzsche conceive of a virtue? A virtue in the traditional Aristotelian conception is a disposition to feel a certain emotion or undertake a certain action appropriately: to the right extent, under the right circumstances, and for the right reasons. A virtue in the conception of recent neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists is, as Alfano puts it, "a complex disposition comprising [...] a perceptual sensitivity, a tendency to construe ambiguous situations in particular ways, a standing motivation, deliberative excellence, and the ability to carry out intentions reliably and successfully" (2013: 773–4). He describes a Nietzschean virtue, by contrast, as "a sophistication of [...] a drive: a motivational action-tendency calibrated both to its bearer and to the situation" (Alfano 2013: 774). This account is supported by Lester Hunt's (1991: 71) analysis of a passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (I, 5):

Once you suffered passions [*hattest du Leidenschaften*] and called them evil. But now you have only your virtues left: they grew out of your passions. You commended your highest goal to the heart of

⁷ Hookway (2006: 102–3) acknowledges this as part of the pragmatist heritage of his own focus on inquiry as an *activity*, involving its own practical ends and often aimed at further practical ends.

⁸ Not unlike Aristotle, whose verdict in Book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that the life of contemplation is the best kind of life makes intellectual virtues integral to ethical excellence.

these passions: then they became your virtues and passions you enjoyed [*Freudenschaften*].

A drive is, roughly, a pre-rational desire or inclination to engage in a certain type of activity, which may be directed toward any of a number of specific objects (e.g., my eating drive can be directed toward the pasta in my kitchen cabinet or the shawarma from the shop down the street; my drive for intellectual engagement is currently directed toward Nietzsche's philosophy, but it could be and at times has been directed toward historical linguistics).⁹

A drive is "calibrated to its bearer and to the situation," and thus counts as a *virtue*, when the bearer is consistently capable of effectively pursuing the aims of the drive. However, the exercise of the drive need not be beneficial to the bearer in order to be a virtue. On the contrary:

[V]irtues (like industriousness, obedience, chastity, filial piety, and justice) are usually harmful for those who possess them, being instincts that dominate them too violently and covetously and resist the efforts of reason to keep them in balance with their other instincts. When you have a virtue, a real, whole virtue (and not merely a mini-instinct for some virtue), you are its *victim*. (GS 21)

One might object that here Nietzsche is talking only about qualities that are *considered* virtues in cultures that accept an altruistic morality, not the qualities that Nietzsche himself reveres as virtues. Many of the specific virtues (or "virtues") he names in this passage are ones he holds in contempt. However, the section of *Zarathustra* from which Hunt draws his account of the origin of virtue suggests that the principle applies to Nietzschean as well as altruistic virtues. "Man is something that must be overcome," Zarathustra concludes; "and therefore you shall love your virtues, for you will perish of them" (Z I, 5). Zarathustra is speaking of unique individual virtues, "too exalted for the familiarity of names," as well as virtues shared with the "herd"; all of them, if they are "real, whole" virtues, have the tendency to consume those who possess them, or rather are possessed by them. Every virtue "wants your whole spirit that it might become *her* herald;

⁹ My understanding of the nature of drives and their role in Nietzsche's philosophical psychology has benefited from the work of Richardson (1996), Alfano (2010), Katsafanas (2013), and Anderson (2013), among others.

each wants your whole strength in wrath, hatred, and love” (Z I, 5). Nietzsche indicates in many texts that he, like Zarathustra, considers it virtuous to let a virtue (including honesty and curiosity) lead one into danger (see, e.g., *GS* 283, 285; *BGE* 45, 227). Perhaps, though, there is a higher sense in which the virtue benefits its bearer—contributes to her flourishing or the health of her soul as Nietzsche understands it—precisely by destroying her physical health and psychological equilibrium.

In the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature and identity of the virtues hews closer to the traditional Aristotelian one than in later works. The virtues he names—justice, courage, magnanimity (*Grossmuth*), wisdom (*HL* 6, 8)—belong to the Platonic-Aristotelian canon. Nietzsche even adverts to the doctrine of the mean: that a virtue lies at the midpoint between two vices, an insufficiency and an excess in the feeling or action governed by the virtue. For example, courage lies between rashness, which involves feeling insufficient fear in response to danger, and cowardice, which involves feeling too much fear. Thus Nietzsche writes on the meager intellectual courage of David Strauss:

[O]ur culture philistine is somewhat cowardly, even when he is strongly moved: and it is precisely the fact that Strauss is a degree less cowardly that makes him a leader, while on the other hand there are very definite limits to *his* courage. [...] If anyone thought to call this moderation and *mediocritas* in courage, which if not wise is at any rate prudent, an Aristotelian virtue he would be in error: for this species of courage is the mean, not between two faults, but between a fault and a virtue—and it is within this mean between virtue and fault that *all* the qualities of the philistine lie. (*DS* 8, pp. 39–40)

By *HL* Nietzsche has already begun using the language of drives, even in relation to virtues: he speaks of the play drive (*Spieltrieb*), the drive to truth (*Wahrheitstrieb*), and the drive to justice (*Gerechtigkeitstrieb*) (*HL* 6). He also makes clear that a person must exhibit both the drive and the ability to successfully achieve its aim in order to count as having the virtue of justice; neither is sufficient without the other:

The truth is that few serve truth because few possess the pure will to be just and of those few only a few also possess the strength to be able to be just. To possess only the will is absolutely not enough:

and the most terrible sufferings sustained by mankind have proceeded precisely from those possessing the drive to justice but lacking the power of judgment [...] (HL 6, p. 89)

So it seems that in the *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche's understanding of virtue does not differ so much from that of contemporary responsibilist virtue epistemologists like Linda Zagzebski: "a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end" (1996: 137). Nietzsche might dispute the characterization of virtue as *acquired*—he often writes as if he thinks someone who does not already have at least the beginnings of a virtue will never possess it¹⁰—but he allows that a virtue already possessed to some degree can be "cultivated" (HL foreword; cf. *BGE* 227).

3. Justice as epistemic virtue and affect

As noted in my introduction, and as indicated by the excerpt from *HL* 1 quoted there, Nietzsche distinguishes between the justice of actions and the justice of judgments—or, as we might say, between practical and epistemic justice. His primary interest in *HL* is in the latter (as one might expect in a critique of nineteenth-century historiography).¹¹ But what is epistemic justice, according to Nietzsche? And how is it similar enough to the more familiar practical type of justice to warrant sharing its name (Nietzsche's assertion that practical justice requires epistemic injustice notwithstanding)?

Nietzsche himself makes the connection explicit in *Human, All Too Human* (1878), alluding to the traditional conception of justice as "giving everyone his due":

There is, to be sure, a quite different species of genius, that of justice [...] It is the way of this kind of genius to avoid with hearty indignation everything that confuses and deceives us in our judgment of things; it is consequently an *opponent of convictions*, **for it wants to give to each his own, whether the thing be dead or living, real or imaginary**—and to that end it must have a clear knowledge of

¹⁰ Consider, e.g., this scathing aside in *DS* 9: "supposing, that is, that virtue can be taught and a pedant can ever become a dancer" (p. 44).

¹¹ Jensen (2016) helpfully details the intellectual context in which *HL* was written, identifying the specific historiographical schools that Nietzsche lampoons in more or less vague terms.

it; it therefore sets everything in the best light and observes it carefully from all sides.
(*HH* 636, italics original, bold emphasis added)

Nietzsche reiterates this analogy between epistemic and practical justice in *Assorted Opinions and Maxims* (1879):

From the thinker's innermost experience.— Nothing is more difficult for man than to apprehend a thing impersonally: I mean to see it as a thing, *not as a person*: one might question, indeed, whether it is at all possible for him to suspend the clockwork of his person-constructing, person-inventing drive even for a moment. He traffics even with *ideas*, though they be the most abstract, as if they were individuals with whom one has to struggle, to whom one has to ally oneself, whom one has to tend, protect and nourish. [...] Let one ponder this and then think on a little further: certainly no one will then speak of a “drive to knowledge [*Erkenntnistriebe*] in and for itself”— Why then does man prefer the true to the untrue in this *secret* struggle with idea-persons [...]? For the same reason as he practices *justice* in traffic with real persons: now out of habit, heredity and training, *originally* because the true—as also the fair and just—is more *useful* and *more productive of honor* than the untrue. (AOM 26)

In *HL* Nietzsche says that justice is “the noblest center [*Kern*] of the so-called drive to truth [*Wahrheitstriebes*]” (*HL* 6, p. 89); in *AOM* 26 he goes so far as to suggest that for “the thinker,” the person whose vocation lies in the realm of ideas and whose interactions with ideas and with figures in history may be more important (and more frequent) than her interactions with living people, the drive to truth or knowledge *simply is* the desire to be just in her dealings. However, this does not mean that epistemic justice should be reduced to or identified with practical justice, given that Nietzsche thinks one must be in a state of epistemic injustice to exercise practical justice, and that (conversely) someone with a strong drive to epistemic justice might have little inclination to practical justice.¹²

Epistemic justice is the motivation and consistent ability to give everything—every person, event, institution, or idea, past or present—its due: to accord it the correct amount of importance and value, credit and blame. This understanding presupposes that there *is* a correct amount of importance and value to be assigned to everything, which might seem like an odd

¹² Schopenhauer would be a notable example, if we follow Nietzsche's assessment of his epistemic justice in *SE*.

claim coming from a perspectivist like Nietzsche. It may be that in 1874 Nietzsche was still in the grip of a Schopenhauerian metaphysical realism about value (as suggested by his apparent endorsement of the claim that “all that exists is *worthy* of perishing,” *HL* 3, p. 76). But Nietzsche’s perspectivism permits him to regard some perspectives as better, higher, more comprehensive than others. A person with the will to justice can only succeed in *being* just if she occupies such a comprehensive perspective, which Nietzsche thinks only a certain type of person is capable of attaining. As I shall argue in the next section of this paper, this type of person crystallizes in Nietzsche’s later writings into the figure of the philosopher of the future.

Sedgwick (2013) offers a way of making sense of Nietzsche’s claims about the unavoidability of epistemic injustice in *Human, All Too Human* without the presupposition of any sort of robust metaphysical realism:

The injustice we perform is not one that involves an act of injury to some hidden, noumenal realm lurking behind what we experience. [...] Rather, the injustice considered here concerns the fact that all experience occurs within a world [...] of *multiple* surfaces whose diversity cannot be exhausted by any single feeling or by concepts articulated into a standpoint on the basis of that feeling. [...]

What is multiple can always be felt differently and because of this can be considered from another standpoint that reveals an initial perspective’s partiality and injustice. Indeed, we ourselves exemplify this multiplicity.¹³ To be human, Nietzsche notes, means to be able to see differently. No one person ever encapsulates merely one perspective. We are each of us a plurality of feelings and, therefore, standpoints on the world. [...] Conceptual thought, as an articulation of feelings and therefore valuations, seeks to reduce non-conceptual multiplicities down to a conceptual specificity that they do not pertain to as a matter of experience—including our experience of ourselves. This is its injustice. (Sedgwick 2013: 60–61)

Note that the point about the “partiality and injustice” of any given evaluative standpoint, as given either explicitly in a judgment or implicitly in a feeling or “a drive toward something or away from something” (*HH* 32; cf. *D* 30, 99), does not imply that true impartiality and justice require the *absence* of any value judgments, feelings, or drives—the so-called ‘view from

¹³ This is in reference to one of the points Nietzsche makes in *HH* 32: “Finally, the standard by which we measure, our own being, is not an unalterable magnitude, we are subject to moods and fluctuations, and yet we would have to know ourselves as a fixed standard to be able justly to assess the relation between ourselves and anything else whatever.”

nowhere' that Nietzsche ridicules in *GM* III, 12 as “the dangerous old conceptual fiction [of] a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject’ [...] an eye that is completely unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction.” The way to overcome the partiality and injustice of any particular standpoint is not to attempt (*per impossibile*) to occupy no standpoint at all, but to try to assemble as many partial perspectives as possible:

[T]o see differently in this way, to *want* to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as “contemplation without interest” (which is a nonsensical absurdity), but as the ability *to control* one’s pro and con and to dispose of them,¹⁴ so that one knows how to employ a *variety* of perspectives and affective interpretations in the service of knowledge. [...] There is *only* a perspective seeing, *only* a perspective “knowing”; and the *more* affects we allow to speak about one thing, the *more* eyes, different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our “concept” of this thing, our “objectivity,” be. But to eliminate the will altogether, to suspend each and every affect, supposing we were capable of this—what would that mean but to *castrate* the intellect? (GM III, 12)

Thirteen years earlier in *HL*, Nietzsche is already insisting that historical justice is *not* a matter of either having no feelings toward or making no value judgments about the objects of historical inquiry—contrary to the misconception of “the inexperienced,” who are prone to “interpret the mere absence of abrasiveness and harsh condemnation of the past as evidence of the virtue of justice” (*HL* 6, p. 89). In fact, he says that although critical history is usually conducted in a spirit of injustice because it proceeds from the needs of “life alone,” “in most cases the sentence [i.e., condemnation] would be the same even if it were pronounced by justice itself” (*HL* 3, p. 76). Nietzsche also emphasizes, as remarked in the introduction, that justice is not the same as “objectivity.”¹⁵ In this early work, Nietzsche still understands objectivity roughly as “contemplation without interest,” which he has not yet come to see as a complete “nonsensical

¹⁴ “[...] *das Vermögen, sein Für und Wider in der Gewalt zu haben und aus- und einzuhängen.*” Clark and Swensen translate this as “the capacity to have one’s pro and contra *in one’s power*, and to shift them in and out.” Neither translation quite captures the image of putting up and taking down a flag or a sign that the pair “*aus- und einzuhängen*” conjures.

¹⁵ Jensen (2016: 106–7) reads Nietzsche as presenting justice as a superior *type* of objectivity. This might make better sense of the connection between justice as described in the early-middle works and the new kind of “objectivity” Nietzsche sketches in *GM* III, 12. Nonetheless, it seems that in *HL* Nietzsche is setting justice apart from objectivity; and it’s worth noting that in *GM* III, 12 “objectivity” appears in scare quotes.

absurdity” (*GM* III, 12). “[I]n its highest interpretation,” objectivity is “a condition in the historian that permits him to observe an event in all its motivations and consequences so purely that it has no effect at all on his own subjectivity” (*HL* 6, p. 91). But this kind of objectivity is no guarantee at all of justice. “Objectivity and justice have nothing to do with one another. A historiography could be imagined which had in it not a drop of common empirical truth and yet could lay claim to the highest degree of objectivity” (p. 91). At best, objectivity is the creative stance of the artist, “that aesthetic phenomenon of detachment from personal interest [...] of complete absorption in the things themselves” (p. 91),¹⁶ which does not in itself require a commitment to getting things *right*, either factually or evaluatively. At worst, objectivity is a pose of “ostentatious indifference” adopted by modern historians to demonstrate their (supposed) judicious impartiality—“a lack of feeling and moral strength” that “disguise[s] itself as incisive coldness and detachment” (p. 93).

The “coldness” that Nietzsche associates with the exercise of epistemic justice, leading the just man to resemble “a cold demon of knowledge” who “spreads about him the icy atmosphere of a dreadful suprahuman majesty” (*HL* 6, p. 88, excerpted above), should not be mistaken for indifference or lack of feeling. “There are very many truths that are a matter of complete indifference; there are problems whose just [*richtig*] solution does not demand even an effort, let alone a sacrifice. In this region of indifference and absence of danger a man may well succeed in becoming a cold demon of knowledge”—but he might still lack the “stern and great justice [*strenger und grosser Gerechtigkeit*]”¹⁷ (p. 89) that Nietzsche praises as the most venerable virtue. The fully just person “sets weight upon weight with *inexorable disregard of*

¹⁶ Here Nietzsche seems to be endorsing a Kantian-Schopenhauerian picture of aesthetic experience that he later repudiates, notably in *GM* III, 6 and *TI* IX, 24.

¹⁷ Hollingdale translates this as “stern and great sense of justice,” probably because the direct translation sounds odd and unidiomatic, but I read him as referring to the virtue itself rather than a “sense” for it.

himself,” not with indifference (p. 88, emphasis added); his will to be just is so powerful that it overrides any other preferences or predispositions he might have. In the (perhaps anachronistic) terms of the drive psychology that has been extracted from Nietzsche’s later works, the will to justice is his “master drive,” which either bends his other drives to its service or subdues them. His coldness is of the same type as the “severity and hardness” prized in noble value systems or “master morality”; the just person, as a subtype of the noble, is “one who has power over himself” and “delights in being severe and hard with himself” (*BGE* 260) for the sake of his dominant virtue. It demands extraordinary severity and hardness, for it is “an impossible virtue,” and he is in constant danger of being “tragically consumed” by it (*HL* 6, p. 88).

Why does Nietzsche think it is so difficult to be fully just in regard to history? Part of it is surely related to his claim that “in most cases” justice would reach the same conclusion as critical history: that “all that exists is *worthy* of perishing” (*HL* 3, p. 76). This claim reflects Nietzsche’s early-1870s pessimism: he held that Schopenhauer was correct in his assessment of the value of existence but did not follow him to the normative conclusion that we *ought* to work to bring about the end of existence, instead insisting throughout *HL* as well as *The Birth of Tragedy* on the necessity of illusion for making life seem worth living. The determination to be just requires the thinker to fully confront the horror of existence, the atrocities of the past and the emptiness of the present, as well as the ultimate insignificance of everything he loves.

In the next *Untimely Meditation*, “Schopenhauer as Educator” (also published in 1874), Nietzsche expands on the difficulties faced by the person committed to justice. Schopenhauer is his example of such a person; and while Nietzsche acknowledges that Schopenhauer did not always succeed in being just, he is never designated as a “fanatic” who possesses “the drive to justice,” or “the blind desire to be a judge,” but lacks “the power of judgment” (*HL* 6, p. 89). The

“Schopenhauerian man” is

strangely composed about himself and his own welfare, in his knowledge full of blazing, consuming fire and far removed from the cold and contemptible neutrality of the so-called scientific man, exalted high above all sullen and ill-humored reflection, always offering himself as the first sacrifice to recognized truth [*erkannten Wahrheit*]¹⁸ and permeated with the awareness of what sufferings must spring from his truthfulness. He will, to be sure, destroy his earthly happiness through his courage; he will have to be an enemy to those he loves and to the institutions which have produced him; **he may not spare men or things, even though he suffers when they suffer**; [...] however much he may strive after justice he is bound, according to the human limitations of his insight, to be unjust [...] (*SE* 4, p. 153, bold emphasis added)

The phrase in boldface draws attention to the similarity between the vocation of the just thinker and that of a judge: both must assess the facts and apply the law with “inexorable disregard” of their own feelings of compassion for the claimants.

In this passage from *SE* the “pathos of the office of judge” (*HL* 6, p. 90)—the “judge of life [*Richter des Lebens*],” in the case of a philosopher like Schopenhauer (*SE* 3, p. 145)—is described as hot rather than cold, a “blazing, consuming fire” rather than an “icy atmosphere of dreadful superhuman majesty.” In *HH* Nietzsche describes the predicament of the human, all too human devotee of justice in terms of a struggle between fiery and icy affects:

He, however, whose spirit is *free* and restlessly alive can prevent this stiffening [of opinions into convictions] through continual change, and even if he should be altogether a thinking snowball, he will have in his head, not opinions, but only certainties and precisely calculated probabilities.— But let us, who are compound creatures, now heated up by fire, now cooled down by the spirit, kneel down before justice as the only goddess we recognize over us. *The fire* in us usually makes us unjust and, from the viewpoint of that goddess, impure [...] We revere her as the veiled Isis of our lives; abashed, we offer up to her our pain as penance and sacrifice whenever the fire seeks to burn and consume us. It is *the spirit* that rescues us, so that we are not wholly reduced to ashes; it tears us away from the sacrificial altar of justice or encloses us in a coat of asbestos. (*HH* 637)

All of these descriptions suggest that the pathos associated with the exercise of epistemic justice is complex. There is an element of reverence for the ideal of justice, envisioned in *HH* 637 as a veiled goddess; a painful sense of one’s own inadequacy as merely human, as “compound creatures” subject to the distorting and limiting effects of our personal needs and impulses, but

¹⁸ Hollingdale has “perceived truth,” which has the misleading connotation of *merely* perceived, or apparent, truth.

still capable of recognizing and striving to overcome or “atone for” (*HL* 6) those limitations; and (as should be expected in a Nietzschean emotion) a twofold feeling of power. The first aspect is, as I suggested above, the noble person’s sense of having power over herself: the power “to have and not to have one’s affects, one’s pro and con, at will” (*BGE* 284), “the ability to control one’s pro and con and to dispose of them” (*GM* III, 12). The second aspect is the feeling of power over the matter to be judged, the historical facts and agents under scrutiny. Nietzsche reminds the would-be judge that “[a]s judge, you must stand higher than he who is to be judged” (*HL* 6, p. 93); “the pathos of the office of judge” (p. 90) incorporates something of the “*pathos of distance*” with which the noble looks down on the rest of humanity (*BGE* 257; *GM* I, 2). In the person who is unqualified to judge, it is inexcusably presumptuous to usurp this position of height and power, but in the genuinely just person, it is another mark of nobility: “*The noble soul has reverence [Ehrfurcht] for itself*” (*BGE* 287). And this is only fitting, since Nietzsche insists that “no one has a greater claim to our veneration [*Verehrung*] than he who possesses the drive to and strength for justice,” that he is “set [...] on a solitary height as the most venerable [*ehrwürdigste*] exemplar of the species man” (*HL* 6, p. 88).

This point about the role of *power* and the feeling of power in the affect associated with epistemic justice brings out another respect in which the ideal of justice in the *Untimely Meditations* persists into *On the Genealogy of Morality*—not only in the picture of perspectivist objectivity in *GM* III, 12, but also in the account of justice in its more conventionally practical and political application in *GM* II. In his rebuttal to Eugen Dühring’s theory that justice developed out of the impulse to revenge, Nietzsche returns to the subject of the individual virtue of justice:

[...] as for Dühring’s specific proposition that the home of justice is to be sought in the sphere of the reactive feelings, one is obliged for truth’s sake to counter it with a blunt antithesis: the *last* ground to be conquered by the spirit of justice is the sphere of the reactive feelings! When it really happens that

the just man remains just even toward those who have harmed him (**and not merely cold, temperate, remote, indifferent: being just is always a positive attitude** [*Verhalten*]¹⁹), when the exalted, clear objectivity, as penetrating as it is mild, of the just and *judging eye* [*des gerechten, des richtenden Auges*] is not dimmed even under the assault of personal injury, derision, and calumny, **this is a piece of perfection and supreme mastery on earth—something it would be prudent not to expect or to believe in too readily**. On the average, a small dose of aggression, malice, or insinuation certainly suffices to drive the blood into the eyes—and fairness out of the eyes—of even the most upright [*rechtschaffensten*] people. The active, aggressive, arrogant man is still a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive man; **for he has absolutely no need to take a false and prejudiced view of the object before him** in the way the reactive man does and is bound to do.

(*GM II*, 11; italics original, bold emphasis added)

The three phrases in boldface are the ones that most clearly echo themes from Nietzsche's treatment of justice in *HL*. The last emphasized phrase indicates that, although Nietzsche is discussing the origin of the practical concept of justice in the establishment of the state (as "a stronger power seeking a means of putting an end to the senseless raging of *ressentiment* among the weaker powers that stand under it"; *GM II*, 11), he is also interested in the *epistemic* component of practical justice: the judgment that the person in the position of judge must make about the actions and deserts of the disputants. "[A]fter the institution of the law," the concept of justice is internalized and individuals strive to emulate in their own conduct and judgment the qualities of the good judge who can reach a fair settlement that pacifies the parties in conflict. Nietzsche argues that this ideal of justice could never have originated in the resentment of the injured and their desire for revenge, which has no reason to impose moderation on itself and would only tend to exaggerate the scale of the injury and the malice of the perpetrator. Just as the institution of justice must have originated with the strongest local power whose only interest in the dispute is to see it put to rest,²⁰ the individual best suited to embody the virtue of justice is the one who is confident enough in his own power that he feels no need to denigrate his enemies and

¹⁹ Clark and Swensen translate *Verhalten* as "way of behaving" because the primary meaning of *Verhalten* is "behavior." But given that it is being contrasted with "cold, temperate, remote, indifferent," which describe states of mind as well as or even more readily than ways of behaving, I prefer Kaufmann's translation as "attitude," which can encompass the sense of *Verhalten* as a stance, a comportment, a way of "holding" oneself.

²⁰ I find it helpful to think of the Prince in *Romeo and Juliet* trying to wrangle the feuding Montagues and Capulets.

gives little weight to slights against him (like Mirabeau as described in *GM I*, 10).

The second phrase in boldface (“this is a piece of perfection and supreme mastery on earth...”) echoes the extravagant praise of the just person as “the most *venerable* exemplar of the species man,” who though “only a poor human being” manages to resemble “a cold demon of knowledge” surrounded by “the icy atmosphere of a dreadful suprahuman majesty” (*HL 6*, p. 88). The first highlighted phrase (“and not merely cold...”) reinforces the point that epistemic justice is not mere indifference or lack of feeling; it is neither necessary nor sufficient for being just that one not care about the matter at hand or the judgment reached in regard to it. “[B]eing just is always a *positive* attitude” (*GM II*, 11): a powerful motivation and an assumption or appropriation of power reflecting confidence in one’s worthiness to wield it.

4. The just person and the philosopher of the future

The passage from *HH 637* quoted in the previous section proposes an answer to the question who (other than Schopenhauer) is the just person that Nietzsche imagines: it is the free spirit characterized in *Human, All Too Human*, *The Gay Science*, and Part II of *Beyond Good and Evil*. However, there are hints already in the second and third *Untimely Meditations* that Nietzsche is envisioning someone like the “philosopher of the future” advertised in *BGE*.

Consider the following remarks from the beginning and the end of *HL 6* on the just person who is entitled to judge:

[...] he desires truth, not as cold, ineffectual knowledge, but as a regulating and punishing judge; truth, not as the egoistic possession of the individual, but as the sacred right [*Berechtigung*] to overturn all the boundary-stones of egoistic possessions; in a word, truth as the Last Judgment and not, for instance, as the prey joyfully seized by the individual huntsman. (p. 88)

As judge, you must stand higher than he who is to be judged, whereas all you are is subsequent to him. The guests who come last to table have to be content with the last places: and do you want the first? Then at least perform some high and great deed; perhaps then they really will make room for you, even if you do come last. [...]

To sum up: history is written by the experienced and superior man. He who has not experienced greater and more exalted things than other will not know how to interpret the great and exalted things

of the past. When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the future and know the present will you understand it. [...] Draw about yourself the fence of a great and comprehensive hope, of a hope-filled striving. Form within yourself an image to which the future shall correspond [...] (pp. 93–4)

The description of the just person as “an architect of the future” who has in mind “an image to which the future shall correspond,” who possesses “the sacred right to overturn all boundary-stones,” calls to mind the philosopher whose task is the revaluation of all existing values and the creation of new ones, who “with a creative hand [...] reach[es] for the future” (*BGE* 211), whose “secret” is “to know of a *new* greatness of man, of a new untrodden way to his enhancement” (*BGE* 212). Whether or not Nietzsche had by 1874 reached his mature conception of the philosopher of the future or the revaluation of values is debatable, but we know that he was already contemplating something like it: in *The Birth of Tragedy* he expresses his hope for a reinvention of German culture via the replacement of Socratic values with a new merger of Socratic and tragic values; and in “Schopenhauer as Educator” he adduces “the history of India, which is almost the history of Indian philosophy,” as proof that a philosopher “is capable of drawing whole nations after him through [his] example” (*SE* 3, pp. 136–7).

A passage from “Schopenhauer as Educator” that connects the task of the philosopher, as Nietzsche understood it in 1874, with the demands of epistemic justice also suggests a connection with his later conception of the philosopher’s task:

Let us think of the philosopher’s eye resting upon existence: he wants to determine its value anew. For it has been the proper task of all great thinkers to be lawgivers as to the measure, stamp, and weight of things. How it must obstruct him if the mankind most immediate to him is a feeble and worm-eaten fruit! How much allowance he has to make for the valuelessness of his time if he is to be just to existence as a whole! [...] That is why, when he compares his own age with other ages, the philosopher must deliberately under-assess it and, **by overcoming the present in himself** [*indem er für sich die Gegenwart überwindet*], also overcome it in the picture he gives of life, that is to say render it unremarkable and as it were paint it over. [...] A modern thinker will, to repeat, always suffer from an unfulfilled desire: he will want first to be shown life again, true, red-blooded, healthy life, so that he may then pronounce his judgment on it. To himself at least he will regard it as necessary that he should be a living human being if he is to believe he can be a just judge. [...] But this longing also constitutes their *danger*: there is a struggle within them between the reformer of life and the philosopher, that is to say the judge of life. (*SE* 3, pp. 144–5, bold emphasis added)

The later Nietzsche does not hold that it is the philosopher's task to be "the judge of life," or that any "living human being" could be "a just judge" of life as a whole. In *Twilight of the Idols* (1888) he declares that "*the value of life cannot be estimated*. Not by the living, for they are an interested party, even a bone of contention, and not judges [...] For a philosopher to see a problem in the value of life is thus an objection to him" (*TI* II, 2). But there is still a respect in which he holds that philosophers are "lawgivers as to the measure, stamp, and weight of things" (*SE* 4), assuming that the "things" are not to be weighed all together as a single aggregate. The "future task of the philosophers" is still "the solution of the *problem of value*"—not the problem of the value of life, but "the determination of the *order of rank among values*" (*GM* I, Note).

In Book V of *The Gay Science* (1887), Nietzsche echoes his earlier essay, perhaps deliberately,²¹ in naming one of the demands of the philosopher's task:

If one would like to see our European morality for once as it looks from a distance, and if one would like to measure it against other moralities, past and future, then one has to proceed like a wanderer who wants to know how high the towers in a town are: he *leaves* the town. "Thoughts about moral prejudices," if they are not meant to be prejudices about prejudices, presuppose a position *outside* morality, some point beyond good and evil to which one has to rise, climb, or fly [...] the question is whether one really *can* get up there. This may depend on manifold conditions. [...] One must have liberated oneself from many things that oppress, inhibit, hold down, and make heavy precisely us Europeans today. The human being of such a beyond who wants to behold the supreme measures of value of his time **must first of all "overcome" his time in himself** [*diese Zeit in sich selbst zu "überwinden"*]*—this is the test of his strength—and consequently not only his time but also his prior aversion and contradiction against this time [...]* (*GS* 380, italics original, bold emphasis added)

The phrases I have emphasized in the passages from *SE* 4 and *GS* 380 express the same idea: that in order to perform his distinctive task—the just evaluation of life in *SE*; the just evaluation of values in *GS*—the philosopher must overcome (*überwinden*) the impression that his own time

²¹ *GS* 380 contains a number of echoes of the titles of his previous works: its heading, "*The wanderer' speaks*," alludes to *The Wanderer and His Shadow* (1880); the phrase "Thoughts about moral prejudices" is borrowed from the subtitle of *Daybreak* (1881); and he also incorporates the phrase "beyond good and evil." This might have had something to do with the fact that Nietzsche had been reissuing his earlier works with new prefaces in 1886, and this section was in a new part added to a re-issue of *The Gay Science*.

tends to make on him. In *SE* 4 this is a matter of resisting the tendency to give too much weight to the closest and thus most salient evidence about the value of existence, namely, the value of his own time (which for a modern philosopher, Nietzsche thinks, is bound to be negative). In *GS* 380 the philosopher's challenge is to free himself from the dominant value perspective of his time—but also, he stresses, from his own “aversion” to the spirit and values of his time (which Nietzsche suggested in *SE* was what tripped up Schopenhauer), which might lead him to be unjust by dismissing or neglecting any of its benefits or advantages.

I have so far cited only texts from Nietzsche's published works (to which I generally prefer to give precedence), but two notes from 1884 help to reinforce the link I have suggested between the epistemic virtue of justice as treated in Nietzsche's works of the 1870s and the ideas of perspectivism and the philosopher's task of revaluing values found in the later works.

Insight: all evaluation is made from a definite perspective: that of the *preservation* of the individual, a community, a race, a state, a church, a faith, a culture.— Because we *forget* that valuation is always from a perspective, all sorts of contradictory estimations and *therefore contradictory drives* swarm within *one* man. This is the *expression of the diseased condition in man*, in contrast to the animals, in which all existing instincts fulfill quite definite tasks.

This contradictory creature has in his nature, however, a great method of acquiring *knowledge*: he feels many pros and cons, he raises himself *to justice*—to a comprehension *beyond the estimation of good and evil*.

The wisest man would be *the richest in contradictions*, who has, as it were, feelers for all types of men: and in the midst, his great moments of *grandiose harmony*—a rare *accident* even in us!—A sort of planetary motion— (KSA 11:26[119], published as WP 259)

Justice, as the function of a broad panoramic [*umherschauenden*] power that looks beyond the narrow perspectives of good and evil and thus has a broader horizon of *advantage*—the intention to preserve something that is more than this or that person. (KSA 11:26[149])²²

Neither these texts nor *GS* 380 directly attributes this ability to transcend the perspective of good and evil, which in the 1884 notes Nietzsche identifies with justice, to the philosopher of the

²² These passages were brought to my attention by Cox 1997 (which provides an insightful analysis of perspectivism). I modified Kaufmann's translation of WP 259 somewhat, taking cues from Cox (1997: 286), to bring it closer to the German text in the KSA (including emphases); I borrowed the translation of KSA 11:26[149] from Cox (1997: 286 n. 71), who in turn modified Krell's translation of Heidegger's quotation in his work on Nietzsche.

future. I have identified one circumstantial connection in *GM I*, Note, where Nietzsche assigns to the philosopher the task of evaluating various value systems, which in *GS* 380 he describes as the desire to “measure [our European morality] against other moralities, past and future.” But these notes also have resonances with the final sections of Part VI of *Beyond Good and Evil*, where Nietzsche provides his most thorough characterization of the philosopher of the future:

Perhaps [the philosopher] himself must have been critic and skeptic and dogmatist and historian [...] and moralist and seer and “free spirit” and almost everything in order to pass through the whole range of human values and value feelings and to be *able* to see with many different eyes and consciences, from a height and into every distance, from the depths into every height, from a nook into every expanse. But all these are merely preconditions of his task: this task itself demands something different—it demands that he *create values*. (*BGE* 211)

And in the following section he offers a definition of greatness that echoes his characterization of “the wisest man” in *WP* 259: “And the philosopher will betray something of his own ideal when he posits: ‘[...] Precisely this shall be called *greatness*: being capable of being as manifold as whole, as ample as full’” (*BGE* 212).

My final piece of circumstantial evidence is a curious phrase in Nietzsche’s enumeration of the philosopher’s virtues in *BGE* 213: “the pleasure and exercise of the great justice [*die Lust und Übung in der grossen Gerechtigkeit*].” Recall that Nietzsche’s ideal historian possesses “a stern and great justice [*strenger und grosser Gerechtigkeit*]” (*HL* 6, p. 89) that most historical virtuosi lack, despite their vaunted objectivity. And note that here too Nietzsche connects justice with a “pathos”: a pleasure associated with the same feeling of power and pathos of distance (“the loftiness of lordly glances and glances *down* [*herrschender Blicke und Niederblicke*]”) that, I have argued, attend the exercise of epistemic justice in the *Untimely Meditations*.

5. Conclusion

In this paper I hope to have made a convincing case for five claims: (1) Nietzsche’s conception of a distinctively epistemic virtue of justice, which receives its most extensive

treatment in “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” but recurs in “Schopenhauer as Educator” and *Human, All Too Human*, is worthy of scholarly attention. (2) This virtue fits neatly into an understanding of Nietzsche as an inquiry responsibilist virtue epistemologist, as proposed by Alfano (2013). (3) Nietzschean epistemic justice, in keeping both with Nietzsche’s early Aristotelian conception of virtue and with his later drive-based conception, involves an important *affective* component. (4) This early notion of an affective epistemic justice foreshadows Nietzsche’s perspectivist understanding of knowledge and objectivity. (5) The image of the just person as described in *HL* survives into the later works in the figure of the philosopher of the future.

I know that I have far from exhausted the topic of epistemic justice. I have said nothing, for example, on the relationship between the “unconditional will to be just” (*HL* 6, p. 89) and the “unconditional will to truth” critiqued in the Third Essay of the *Genealogy*. Nor have I commented on the change in the status of *curiosity* from an unworthy impetus for “the striving for truth,” one that “in reality [has] nothing to do with truth, which has its roots in justice” (*HL* 6, p. 89), to one of Nietzsche’s cardinal epistemic virtues (as Alfano 2013 argues). If I have successfully demonstrated the first of the claims listed above, then perhaps these and other related issues will be taken up in subsequent work.

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Primary texts are cited with an abbreviation for the title, Roman numerals for the larger divisions of the text where relevant, and Arabic numerals for the aphorism numbers.

Abbreviations

<i>A</i>	<i>The Antichrist</i>
<i>AOM</i>	<i>Assorted Opinions and Maxims</i> (first part of <i>Human, All Too Human</i> Vol. II)
<i>BGE</i>	<i>Beyond Good and Evil</i>
<i>D</i>	<i>Daybreak</i>
<i>DS</i>	“David Strauss, the Confessor and Writer” (<i>Untimely Meditations</i> I)
<i>GM</i>	<i>On the Genealogy of Morality</i>
<i>GS</i>	<i>The Gay Science</i>
<i>HH</i>	<i>Human, All Too Human</i> (Volume I)
<i>HL</i>	“On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life” (<i>Untimely Meditations</i> II)
<i>KSA</i>	<i>Kritische Studienausgabe</i>
<i>SE</i>	“Schopenhauer as Educator” (<i>Untimely Meditations</i> III)
<i>TI</i>	<i>Twilight of the Idols</i>
<i>WP</i>	<i>The Will to Power</i>

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